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Professional Secrecy: A Vincible Right 
Harmon L. Smith, Ph.D. 
Several years ago there was a 
flurry of interest and activity 
among university faculty and un-
dergraduates who were concerned 
about the inclusion of extra-aca-
demic information on transcripts. 
That a transcript itself was avail-
Dr. Smith, a professor of Moral 
Theology at Duke University, is 
a frequent contributor to Linacre. 
His article examines the subtle-
ties and intricacies which arise 
from the question "who is en-
titled to know what from whom?" 
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able, e.g., to prospective em-
ployers,only by permission of its 
putative owner (that is, the stu-
dent) was little comfort if the 
document conveyed disciplinary 
or other information incidental to 
academic performance. This prob-
lem was resolved in many uni-
versities by separating academic 
from other student records. 
In the 1970's sickle cell disease 
became a national health concern 
of enormous proportions, federal 
budgeting for programs increased 
dramatically, and several states 
adopted legislation which requires 
screening for the disease. Despite 
the apparent and obvious bene-
fits which derive from heightened 
concern for both carriers and af-
fected patients, some persons 
have protested that employment 
and insurance eligibility have 
been affected by their having 
been identified as heterozygous 
asymptomatic carriers and that 
public programs for mandatory 
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screening constitute an invasion 
of privacy. 
The proposal, in the 1960's, to 
create a unified national data 
system met insurmountable (at 
least then!) objections from many 
sectors of the general public. Now 
something similar- though clear-
ly more modest - is being pro-
posed (in some instances already 
rudimentarily operative) for com-
puter-based medical records. But 
because of the evident risks to 
"medical privacy" both physi-
cians and patients are concerned 
about the security needs for such 
a system and whether the present 
level of privacy for sensitive medi-
cal data , or protection of privi-
leged medical communications, 
can be guaranteed. 
Conflicting Loyalties 
Most people have by now seen 
enough of "Marcus Welby, M.D." 
and "Medical Center" to know 
that professional secrecy is rather 
more complicated than the pro-
verbial coathanger. And many 
others of us have first-hand 
awareness of the problems asso-
ciated with privileged information 
from our experience in examina-
tion rooms or confessionals. But 
the problem of confidentiality is 
not unique to physicians or 
priests, or professors or program-
mers - it is genuinely problem-
atic for every situation, profes-
sional or not, in which one has 
access to another's personal af-
fairs which would otherwise re-
main private. 
The nub of the problem has 
fundamentally to do with con-
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flicting loyalties - both of which, 
it can be argued, are relatively 
appropriate but neither of which, 
it can also be argued, is either al-
ways or universally overriding of 
the other. At stake, in matters of 
professional secrecy, are not only 
debated protocols which fit pro-
fessional identity and function 
but an enormously complex web 
of inter-professional and inter-
personal relationships as well. 
"Who is entitled to know what 
from whom?" is one way to for-
mulate the question; but under-
lying the apparent simplicity of 
that query are many other subtle 
and intricate puzzles. Among 
these are "what do you know?" 
and "whose information is it?" 
and "are we ever or always obli-
gated to tell less than we know?" 
and "what are we to do when the 
interests and needs of a private 
individual appear to conflict with, 
or perhaps threaten, the larger 
public welfare?" 
One of my physician friends , 
who has had extensive experience 
in genetics counseling, is con-
vinced that there are some situa-
tions in which telling the whole 
truth will result in more harm 
than good; and he has cited two 
cases in . support of his view. In 
one case, a child's genetic dis-
order opens the possibility of non-
paternity - i.e., the husband's 
genotype indicates the he may 
not be the child's father. In the 
other case, a four-year-old child 
had multiple congenital malform-
ations and there was a question of 
possible chromosome etiology. On 
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examination the child was found 
to be a 45,Xj 46,XY sexual mo-
saic. Because the mother had al-
ready undergone considerable 
psychic trauma - from the belief 
that her child was being punished 
for something which she had done 
- the physician decided that it 
would be more than the woman 
could bear to tell her t.hat the 
child had a sex chromosome ab-
normality in addition to congeni-
tal malformations - which in-
cluded mental retardation, club-
foot, and a heart defect. 
"The Whole Truth" 
Both of these cases have to do 
not so much with protecting in-
formation which was obtained 
under a pledge of confidentiality 
but with denying access to in-
formation which was sought by 
diagnosis. Perhaps more impor-
tantly for our purposes, here, 
both these cases raise the ques-
tions, "what do you know?" and 
"whose information is it?" It is 
clear that in neither instance does 
the physician have "the whole 
truth" - that is, he cannot claim 
evidentiary certainty in the first 
case that the husband is not the 
father; nor can he, in the second 
case, establish reasonable grounds 
for heightened maternal guilt 
since he knows that the child's 
being a sexual mosaic has nothing 
to do with inheritance or risk of 
recurrence. Is the physician then 
obligated to tell what he does 
know? Barring the patient's - in 
these cases, the parents of minor 
patients - incompetence to re-
ceive the information, I cannot 
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imagine (apart from a misplaced 
paternalism) what warrants 
would be appropriate for with-
holding that knowledge; and this 
is particularly compelling if the 
evident answer to "whose infor-
mation is it?" is "the patient's." 
Moreover, since moral respon-
sibility depends in large measure 
upon freedom to act upon alter-
native choices, knowledge of facts 
and options is critical for setting 
the boundaries of that freedom. I 
know that ignorance is no excuse 
of the law; but that is not the 
case with moral accountability. 
We certainly assess the moral 
responsibility of persons in terms 
of what they do, and by that in-
terest signify that consequences 
of actions are an essential ingred-
ient in the decision-making pro-
cess; but we are also concerned 
for the reasons persons act, for 
the intentions which inform dis-
creet choices, because we are 
aware that (except in frivolous 
choices) why a decision is taken 
is quite as morally significant as 
what was decided and how that 
decision was acted out. Intention, 
method, and consequence are the 
basic rubrics for interpreting and 
judging the moral worth of moral 
choices apprehended in their en-
tirety. Thus to deprive persons of 
information appropriate to their 
choice-making ·is de facto to limit 
their freedom to elect from among 
knowledgable alternatives, and in 
turn to moderate commensurate-
ly their accountability for choices 
and actions. Beyond that, how-
ever, the moral web extends to 
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those who deliberately deprive or 
withhold that information; and 
they become ineluctably impli-
cated in the process. Sometimes 
the judicial process takes account 
of a plaintiff's "ignorance" when 
this has been professionally de-
nied, and sometimes the judicial 
process provides remedy through 
indemnification or other penal-
ties; but it is more probable, be-
cause the issue is so difficult to 
prove, that most people simply 
live out their lives in whatever 
bliss or hardship attends that 
ignorance. 
The Right to Privacy vs. 
The Right to Know 
Occasionally benign neglect 
backfires. I learned recently of a 
case in which, during the course 
of a routine physical examination, 
the physician found that a female 
patient had a positive serology 
and positive smear for gonococ-
cus. The patient did not come 
with that complaint, nor did she 
intend to tell the physician about 
her sexual contacts or that she 
had contracted the disease; but 
by the very nature of the tests, 
all this was communicated. That 
her husband was asymptomatic 
and that this infection is con-
tracted only by venereal contact 
would appear to be sufficient 
grounds for a charge of adultery; 
and that, as it happened, was pre-
cisely what the husband did 
charge when he learned of his 
wife's infection and subsequently 
sued for divorce. 
Did the physician, upon posi-
tive diagnosis of gonorrhea, have 
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any obligations to inform the hus-
band? (There may be questions 
of obligation to a larger public -
e.g., the public health authorities 
- but those can be bracketed 
just now in order to focus on the 
physician's obligation vis-a-vis the 
wife's right to privacy and the 
husband's right to know.) With 
the wife's consent, the physician 
is not only free but arguably 
obliged to tell the husband; with-
out the wife's consent, however, 
the obligations of the physician is 
clouded by the competing inter-
ests of the two parties for whom 
he might be mediator. This seems 
to me clearly a case which drama-
tizes the ambiguity of profession-
al secrecy since to tell the hus-
band would violate the confiden-
tial information conveyed (how-
ever unintentionally) by the wife, 
while failing to tell the husband 
would expose him to risk of in-
fection and disease. 
Getting straight about where 
the priorities lie might free one 
to alternative considerations; and 
if the physician and the patient 
could discuss the possibilities and 
problems of a case like this with 
less regard for profesional confi-
dentiality, and more sensitivity 
and concern for what the wife's 
attitudes and conduct signified 
about her marriage, the crux of 
the issue could be exposed. That 
the wife has a positive diagnosis 
of gonorrhea does not exhaust (or 
even precisely identify) the com-
plete etiology of this infection; in-
deed that positive diagnosis may 
itself be only symptomatic of a 
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more insidious and farther reach-
ing malaise which infects her 
marriage. The practice of quar-
antine for contagious disease 
would appear to grant the prin-
ciple that the right to privacy is 
vincible when public health or 
welfare is jeopardized by it. 
Historically, professional secre-
cy has been essentially a matter 
of protecting the right to privacy; 
but the professional is, of course, 
potentially if not actually an in-
termediary with respect to the in-
formation which has been en-
trusted to him. Despite an occa-
sional demurrer, my experience is 
that there is general consensus 
that these confidences belong, in 
the first immediacy, to the pa-
tient (or client or parishoner) 
whose prerogative it is to share 
or withhold confidential informa-
tion. There are surely instances 
in which, because of the mutuali-
ty between a professional and a 
person seeking his services, the 
professional's own self-interest is 
sometimes at risk ; but it is pre-
cisely out of the priority of the 
client's well-being - which was 
the precondition for establishing 
a confidential relationship - that 
the client's superior moral claim 
is sustained. 
In some cases this is straight-
forward enough; but most pa-
tients present themselves as par-
ties to other relationships -
spouse, parent, child - and 
those bonds cannot be either cal-
lously rejected or carelessly neg-
lected by physicians or pastors or 
attorneys who suppose that the 
unilateral relationship between 
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themselves and their client is the 
only one of consequence. It is 
ahistorical to act on that predi-
cate, and depersonalizing to 
everybody concerned. I know that 
it complicates matters; but is it 
true - for example, in the case of 
the gonorrheal wife - that the 
doctor-patient relationship is ex 
hypothesi enlarged to include the 
husband? I tend to think so if the 
wife and husband understand 
themselves to be married to each 
other, since it is the totality of 
this action - its etiology, com-
municability, and the rest-
within the context of marriage 
that constitutes the basic desid-
eratum for exposure or secrecy. 
The "principle of totality" was 
formulated with respect to the 
bodily integrity of individuals; 
but I wonder whether - especi-
ally with regard to marriage and 
family, if not the general public 
- it might also have applicability 
to other forms of organic whole-
ness. 
The Public Interest 
The nexus of the issue lies then 
in assessing the relative toler-
ances between private and public 
interests, and in defining as pre-
cisely as we can the relational 
networks which mark the bound-
aries of those interests. Although 
the scales are ordinarily heavily 
weighted in favor of protecting 
individuals in the disclosure of 
confidential information, there is 
a legitimate public interest which 
sometimes intervenes. That in-
terest has customarily been ac-
knowledged when there is prob-
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able cause of criminal activity, 
either prospective or retrospec-
tive, or when evidence is required 
by legal proceedings. So the ex-
tent to which the state can legal-
ly intrude into confidential rela-
tionships, while it varies from 
state to state according to the 
definition of "privilege" and the 
discretion of judges, is prescribed 
by law. But I mean to raise a 
rather more subtle question-
which sometimes, to be sure, finds 
its way into the courts - about 
the moral obligations, which tran-
scend the limits of law, of persons 
in their several relationships. 
Attorneys are protected by 
"privilege" from being required 
to disclose incriminating informa-
tion which was given in confi-
dence by a client; but attorneys 
are obligated to disclose informa-
tion about crimes committed in 
their presence or crimes which 
they may know to be planned for 
the future. Similar provisions for 
differentiating "privilege" from 
"privacy" are provided in other 
circumstances, e.g., restraints for 
requiring testimony from spouses. 
And just now the nation is beset 
by the complexities of "executive 
privilege" and the enormous im-
plications of this (!oncept, and its 
execution, for national (to say 
nothing of constitutional) inter-
ests. But professional and person-
al relationships, most of us like 
to believe, are at most only tan-
gentially amenable to juridical 
models of contracts and checks-
and-balances; and at this level it 
may be more appropriate to talk 
of trust and fairness and honesty 
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than of statutes or judicial proc-
esses or criminal penalties. 
Indeed, it is arguable - and 
compellingly arguable in view of 
past experience - that judicial 
encroachment into professional 
secrets is counter-productive un-
less instrusions remain clearly ex-
ceptionable to the general rule 
not to expose professional confi-
dences. Functional counter-pro-
ductivity is already illustrated by 
fear of subpoena which prompts 
some physicians either to write 
incomplete records or to compose 
the record in ways that are self-
consciously designed to be ambig-
uous or imprecise. The primary 
intention of this artifice is to pro-
tect the physician from unwilling 
testimony and the patient from 
coerced exposure of medical rec-
ords. But by this behavior, and 
despite all the arguments in de-
fense of it, the physician places 
himself above the law. It is only 
another way-not principally un-
like withholding medical informa-
tion from a patient - in which 
professional is at its best incestu-
ous and at its worst solipsistic. 
The promise of professional 
secrecy is that it will protect con-
fidences and guard privacies from 
frivolous and capricious inquiries. 
In the measure to which this is 
accomplished, free and trustful 
relationships can establish the 
context for professional service. 
The peril of professional secrecy 
is not that we will tell less than 
we know, because all of us know 
more than we can tell, but the 
temptation to tell less than we 
can tell. 
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